CO129-614-1 Commission of Inquiry into fire at West Point- report 26-5-1949 - 22-12-1949 — Page 71

}

50

71

by the staff, led to a reduction in absenteeism, and undoubtedly in-

At the date of the fire, the Brigade was almost at

creased efficiency.

its full authorised strength of approximately 325 ranks up to and in- cluding sub-officers, an increase of more than 50% over the pre-war

figure. It was suggested to us that an 8-hour watch system would be

more efficient, and there is no doubt that it would have been in the

circumstances of the Wing On Fire, but the introduction of 8-hour watches

would entail a considerable further increase of staff and expenditure.

We have already stated that the Wing On Fire was of an altogether ex-

ceptional nature, and the Chief Officer in his evidence informed us that

none of the major outbreaks of the past, even that at the Hong Kong and

China Gas Company's premises, had in his recollection exceeded in dura-

tion six hours. We do not think therefore that we should be justified

in recommending an alteration in a system which has otherwise worked

satisfactorily, merely because of the happenings at the Wing On Fire,

We are fortified in this opinion by the fact that a 24-hour on or off

system is considered efficient in the United Kingdom. It is true that

there is a strong movement to introduce an 8-hour watch system, but this

movement springs primarily from the demand for a 48-hour working week,

though the claim is also rightly made that it would be more efficient.

We reiterate that the Fire Brigade equipment and personnel should not

be based on the recurrence of an event such as the Wing On Fire.

Proposal to Establish an Auxiliary Fire Service:

96.

It would be wrong altogether to exclude such a recurrence and we

therefore devoted some attention to a suggestion by the Fire Insurance

Association that the Government should establish an Auxiliary Fire Ser-

vice on the lines of the Police Reserve. This was a useful and attrac-

tive proposal which at first sight commended itself to the Chief Officer,

but on full consideration we cannot recommend it as a practicable pro-

posal. The prime grounds for its rejection are that the utility of such

a service would be in the early stages of a big fire, the period of

greatest strain and fatiguefor firemen. At such a period, auxiliary

firemen, unless kept in a state of mobilisation, would be most diffi-

cult to bring to the scene of the fire, and, unless their presence could